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Through much of the post-World
War II era of trade liberalization, orga-
nized labor and freetraders struck a grand
bargain: negotiated agreements that low-
er tariffs in the United States would be
accompanied by extra welfare benefits
available to people who lose their jobs
because of import competition. As many
free traders see it, such programs can help
mollify the opposition to new trade
agreements and as such are a sacrifice
worth making. But that bargain has bro-
ken down. The new Democratic majori-
ty in Congress has given only half-heart-
ed support for new trade agreements and
has so far refused to grant President Bush
new authority to negotiate and submit
them to Congress without the risk of
deal-killing amendments.
The Trade Adjustment Assistance
program is a relic of the past that reflects
a different economy in a different political
setting.The very existence of trade adjust-
ment assistance perpetuates the myth that
freeing trade creates special “victims” who
deserve special programs simply because
of the reason for their unemployment.
But for every worker who is displaced
because of competition from imports or
“off-shoring,” 30 others lose their jobs for
other reasons such as changes in technol-
ogy and tastes, and domestic competition.
Studies have suggested that workers dis-
placed because of import competition
were equally successful at finding new
jobs as other unemployed workers. Sys-
temic changes that help workers adjust to
new opportunities, such as increasing the
portability of health insurance and retire-
ment savings, and increasing labor market
flexibility to create new jobs, would be
more fitting policy prescriptions for a free
society and a dynamic, service-oriented
economy.
Maladjusted
The Misguided Policy of
“Trade Adjustment Assistance”
by Sallie James
Sallie James is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy
Studies.
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Introduction
Trade adjustment assistance for workers—
taxpayer-funded benefits for those who lose
their jobs because of increased import competi-
tion following trade liberalization—has been in
place since the early 1960s. Enacted along with
the launch of the Kennedy Round of multilater-
al trade negotiations, that assistance was politi-
cally integral to securing organized labor’s sup-
port for negotiated trade liberalization efforts.
From the time of its inception, the rationale
for the program has been to help workers adjust
to trade liberalization by redistributing the gains
from lowering trade barriers from the “winners”
(consumers, import-using producers, and export-
ers) to the “losers” (those who lose their jobs as a
result of import competition).1 That strategy is, in
part, a political response to public concern about
the effect of trade on workers. According to an
April 2006 USA Today/Gallup poll of 1,004
adults nationwide,only 30 percent of respondents
felt that increased trade between the United
States and other countries mostly helps American
workers, compared with 65 percent who felt that
trade hurts workers.Those figures compare to an
earlier poll (taken in November 1999), in which
35 percent thought that trade “helps” and 59 per-
cent said it “hurts.” The perceived impact on
American companies, however, was more favor-
able.2
Congress reauthorized the current Trade
Adjustment Assistance program in 2002 in con-
junction with the renewal of trade promotion
authority (the ability to negotiate trade deals and
submit them to Congress for a straight yes-or-no
vote without possibility of amendment). That
reauthorization was accompanied by a near
tripling of TAA funding. Supporters of the pro-
gram argue, however, that TAA remains under-
funded and ineffective, and have called for fur-
ther expansion of the program when the current
authority expires on December 30, 2007.3
With a low unemployment rate and more
workers than ever involved in the service sector,
now is an ideal time to rethink the rationale
behind the trade adjustment assistance program.
The cost of the program has increased in recent
years, and proposed changes to the program will
add greatly to those costs. At the same time, the
benefits of the program are falling as organized
labor withdraws its support for trade liberaliza-
tion efforts and Congress balks at approving
even minor trade agreements already negotiated
by the president.The Democratic leadership has
indicated that it does not see a renewal of trade
promotion authority as a priority for this
Congress, and the path ahead for pending trade
deals looks uncertain at best.
What’s more, the very existence of trade
adjustment assistance perpetuates the myth
that trade creates “victims” that need special
support over and above those who lose their
jobs because of changes in consumers’ tastes,
domestic competition, or as a result of new
technologies. And by implying that opening
markets to foreign competition infringes on
some kind of “right” that domestic firms have
to market share (an infringement that therefore
deserves compensation), TAA violates the very
underpinnings of a free-market system that
depends—indeed thrives—on the concept of
competition. A free society based on a dynam-
ic economy would do better to replace the
TAA program with policies that respect indi-
vidual freedom and responsibility.
The Theoretical Basis for
Trade Adjustment Assistance
The idea of trade adjustment assistance is
not necessarily inconsistent with a free-trade
agenda. In fact, some economists support such
programs with arguments drawn from welfare
analysis and theorems based on standard mod-
els of international trade. Those theorems state
that free trade will narrow the differences in
prices for tradable goods and, in doing so, will
also narrow the differences in the prices
(incomes) of the factors of production used to
produce the traded goods. In that sense,
importing goods that use a relatively scarce fac-
tor of production intensively, such as low-
skilled labor, is analogous to importing more of
that factor itself, thereby reducing its “price”
(i.e., wages for low-skilled workers).
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3Standard trade theory acknowledges that
openness to trade benefits the owners of rela-
tively abundant factors of production (in the
United States, that is skilled workers and own-
ers of capital) and hurts others (low-skilled
workers). To the extent that some industries are
regional (e.g., carmaking in Detroit, textiles in
North Carolina), some economists have argued
that redistribution would be justified if it helps
workers move to new “clusters” of growing in-
dustries (e.g., high-tech development in Silicon
Valley). The relocation allowance in the TAA
program reflects that geographic friction.
Tariffs aim to stifle these changes in relative
income brought about by trade. In that sense,
they can be thought of as equivalent to a con-
sumption tax and a production subsidy. Barriers
to trade do not create wealth—they merely
redistribute it, and inefficiently at that. So pro-
tecting an industry behind a tariff wall in the
long run creates nothing, even if it protects some
workers from losing their jobs. That protection
comes at the expense of others: consumers and
employees (or would-be employees) of indus-
tries who must now use artificially expensive
inputs.
According to the compensation principle of
welfare analysis, removing tariffs is worthwhile
because the benefits accruing to consumers from
lowering tariffs are more than enough (in theo-
ry) to compensate the formerly protected indus-
tries that lose from import competition. A re-
cent study estimated that trade liberalization
efforts since World War II have boosted the av-
erage American household’s income by $10,000
(and annual U.S. GDP by roughly $1 trillion)
and that eliminating remaining barriers would
boost the average household income by an addi-
tional $4,000 to $12,000.4 Although lifetime
costs of all worker dislocations could come to
$54 billion, the annual gains from removing all
remaining trade barriers would boost GDP by
between $450 billion and $600 billion annual-
ly—a 10 to 1 ratio of benefits to cost.5
Given the United States’ comparative advan-
tage in highly skilled, physical- and human-cap-
ital-intensive industries, trade theory would sug-
gest that highly skilled workers are more likely
to support trade liberalization because they
stand to gain higher wages. That prediction is
not always borne out by the facts, however. In a
2004 survey conducted by the Program on
International Policy Attitudes, only 44 percent
of high- income earners reported a positive view
of international trade in general, down from 63
percent in 1999.6
And contrary to the perception that Euro-
pean voters are more protectionist than Ameri-
cans, support for increasing tariffs to protect
domestic jobs, even if it meant higher prices for
consumers, was higher among Americans (46
percent) than Europeans (37 percent).7
Import Competition Is a Minor Cause
of Job Loss
At a general level, it is not clear that Ameri-
cans overall should be especially concerned about
trade-related unemployment, especially when
unemployment is so low. A paper by Brink
Lindsey in 2004 estimated that of the total “job
churn” in the economy in the average year, the
amount of unemployment related to trade is only
modest.8 In 2006, the Council of Economic
Advisers estimated that, of layoffs of more than
50 people, fewer than 3 percent were attributable
to import competition of off-shoring.9 Research
by Lori Kletzer in 2001 suggested an even small-
er contribution to unemployment: she estimates
that about 310,000 jobs are lost each year
because of import competition, only about 1 per-
cent of gross job losses.10
A recent paper from the Peterson Institute
for International Economics found that domes-
tic factors—contract completion, downsizing,
financial difficulty, and domestic movement of
work—were more likely causes of mass layoffs.11
In any case, the American economy has contin-
ued to show remarkable strength in recent years
and with a 4.5 percent unemployment rate,
there appears to be no chronic shortage of jobs.
Since 1996, the American private sector has
added a net 15 million jobs, hardly evidence of a
national crisis necessitating a federal response
(Table 1).
Of course, this job churn may mask some
frictional unemployment: people who lose their
jobs may not be the same who are employed in
growing industries.The skills mismatch between
A free society 
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with policies that
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employees laid off and employees needed is fre-
quently used as a reason to spend on training
programs, aimed at easing the transition. The
transition, however, provides benefits of its own.
According to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke, the average per-hour earnings in
manufacturing industries laying off workers was
$10.63 during the 1990s. Service industries,
which were expanding over that period, paid
average earnings of $11.26 per hour, a 6 percent
gain.12
Although some workers will lose more than
they gain from trade liberalization, at least in the
short term, their numbers are small, and other
factors—domestic competition, and changing
tastes and technology—are a more important
source of change.
How Trade Adjustment
Assistance Works
Congress initially created trade adjustment
assistance in 1962 as part of the Trade Expan-
sion Act and as a means of securing support for
the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade nego-
tiations. Under the original scheme, responsibil-
ity for determining eligibility and distributing
benefits was shared between the (Federal) Tariff
Commission and state employment agencies.13
If a group of workers could prove that a rise in
imports as a result of prior trade liberalization
was a “major factor” in explaining their unem-
ployment, they could receive cash benefits, relo-
cation allowances, and training to facilitate “ad-
justment” to new jobs.
The Trade Act of 1974 loosened eligibility
requirements and increased cash benefits to dis-
placed workers. Rapid growth in the cost of the
program followed those changes. The Reagan
administration in turn called for reform of the
system, which Congress provided in 1981 by
imposing stricter tests on the link between
imports and job losses, and by lowering cash
benefits, although the new rules placed greater
emphasis on retraining and on job search and
relocation benefits. For example, the 2002 reau-
thorization expanded the health coverage tax
credit and shortened the wait between losing
one’s job and receiving benefits. But the central
idea behind TAA—that compensation for
import competition is needed to keep the liber-
alization ball rolling—has stayed more or less
constant.
As changes were made to the program,
costs have fluctuated. As a result of the changes
4
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Table 1
National Job Turnover, Thousands of Private Sector Employees 
Year Job Gains (gross) Job Losses (gross) Net change
1996 32,490 29,895 2,595
1997 33,714 30,765 2,949
1998 34,625 31,794 2,831
1999 35,505 32,903 2,602
2000 35,084 33,243 1,841
2001 32,451 35,574 -3,123
2002 31,643 32,110 -467
2003 30,074 30,204 -130
2004 31,472 29,383 2,089
2005 31,440 29,362 2,078
2006 30,415 28,630 1,785
Total 358,913 343,863 15,050
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics survey, available from http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin
/surveymost?bd. 
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in 1981, for example, the cost of the program
fell from $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1981 to
$101.6 million in FY 1982.14 The cost of the
program peaked in FY 1980, at $1.6 billion.15
Although they have fallen significantly from
that peak, Figure 1 shows that program costs,
expressed in constant 2000 dollars, have risen
dramatically in recent years compared with a
decade ago.
The almost doubling of spending since FY
2002 largely reflects the changes made in the
Trade Act of 2002.16 That Act reauthorized
the TAA program through FY 2007 for work-
ers (with separate programs for farmers, fisher-
men, and firms) adversely affected by import
competition, including “secondary workers”
employed at upstream producers (e.g., a parts
manufacturer) who supplied a firm whose
workers were deemed TAA-eligible. Benefits
are available also to those workers who can
prove that production has shifted to a country
with which the United States has a preferential
trade agreement, or to which the United States
offers unilateral tariff preferences (e.g., many
developing countries).
When workers believe they have been ad-
versely affected by import competition or “off-
shoring,” they may petition the Department of
Labor for a determination of eligibility. If the
petition is accepted, the workers in that group
are eligible for individual benefits.Table 2 shows
the approximate number of workers covered by
certifications (which may be made for an indi-
vidual factory or group of workers).
The most significant features of the TAA
program, generally implemented at state and
local levels but overseen by the U.S. Department
of Labor, are as follows:
• Reemployment services, such as counsel-
ing, resume-writing, and job-search and
referral assistance;
• Job search allowance, giving up to 90 per-
cent of certain travel costs up to a $1,250
limit;
• Relocation allowances, including moving
5
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costs if relocation is necessary, and a lump
sum equal to three times the previous
average weekly wage (up to $1,250);
• Training—up to a maximum period of
two years;
• Income support while the worker is in
training, although it is also given in “certain
circumstances” even if the worker does not
enroll in training (e.g. because of ill health).
That income support is generally available
for two years, with the first 26 weeks com-
ing from state unemployment insurance
(available to all involuntarily unemployed
workers regardless of the reason), followed
by TAA for the next 26 weeks, and up to
52 weeks of additional benefits to assist the
completion of “training.” The amount of
the income support, called “Trade Re-
adjustment Allowance,” is about the same
as state-based unemployment insurance,
which averages about $280 per week;17 and
• Health Coverage Tax Credit, covering 65
percent of qualified health insurance pre-
mium costs, to those workers who have
lost their employer-sponsored coverage.
In addition to the standard TAA program,
the Trade Act of 2002 included Alternative
Trade Adjustment Assistance (alternative TAA)
for older workers, a limited wage-loss insurance
program, whereby displaced workers over 50
earning less than $50,000 per year may be eligi-
ble to receive half of the difference between their
previous and new earnings, up to a limit of
$10,000 per year for up to two years.
How the TAA Program Fails
Taxpayers, Workers, and the
Free-Trade Cause
Unemployment creates hardship for all laid-
off workers and their families, no matter what
the cause. What, then, explains the different
treatment in favor of trade-affected workers?
One factor may be that the former has an iden-
tifiable foreign cause, whereas, say, technology is
seen as having beneficial effects that outweigh
its “job destroying” nature.
There is much evidence to suggest that the
trade adjustment assistance for workers program
is a relic of the past that reflects a different econ-
omy in a different political setting. Its philosoph-
ical underpinning, program design and adminis-
tration are badly in need of fresh thinking.
Over the past three fiscal years (2004 to
2006), the Government Accountability Office
estimated that fewer than 100,000 workers
sought and received benefits,18 even though
6
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Table 2
Estimated Number of Workers Covered by Certifications
Fiscal Year Number of Certifications Workers Covered
a
2001 1,029 139,587
2002 1,647 235,072
2003 1,890 197,359
2004 1,806 149,240
2005 1,545 117,345
2006 1,407
b
123,000
b
Source: Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration, http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/taa_certs.cfm.
a
Estimated by the companies at the time certification is issued. Workers may be reemployed, never laid off at all, or
additional workers may be laid off.
b
From “Trade Adjustment Assistance: Industry Certification Would Likely Make More Workers Eligible, but Design
and Implementation Challenges Exist, Report to Congressional Requests,” GAO-07-919, June 2007 (Washington:
Government Accountability Office).
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almost 400,000 were certified. The vast major-
ity of U.S. workers laid off because of competi-
tion from imports or offshoring do not choose
to seek government assistance. Workers dis-
placed by trade appear to want to find new jobs
as quickly as possible.
In FY 2006, about 54,000 people received
income support, and about 80,700 participated
in training, for an estimated cost to the program
of $966 million.19 At a cost of about $12,000 per
training participant, it is hard to imagine that
better value training would not be available. Of
those who exited the program in FY2006, 72
percent were reemployed in the following quar-
ter and were still employed six months later.
Those who were reemployed earned, on average,
77 percent of their previous wages.20
A recent U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion Study found that between 2001 and 2005,
workers displaced because of import competition
were equally successful at finding new jobs as
were other unemployed workers.21 Studies using
earlier data,notably a 2001 study by Lori Kletzer,
found that manufacturing workers who were laid
off primarily because of strong import competi-
tion were less likely to be reemployed and expe-
rienced greater losses than workers displaced
from industries facing less competition from
imports.22 But that is because of the sector in
which they were employed, not because of the
reason for their unemployment. Manufacturing
that is especially vulnerable to import competi-
tion happens to employ workers who are older,
less educated and have longer tenure, all charac-
teristics that make them less likely to be reem-
ployed no matter what the reason for their
unemployment. In other words, the TAA pro-
gram reinforces misunderstandings about trade,
in particular the mistaken belief that the “vic-
tims” of trade liberalization are special.
Although the average processing time, for-
merly a key criticism of the program, has fallen
from 96 days in FY 2002 to 31 days in FY
2006,23 the faster processing time seems to have
had unintended consequences. A 2004 Govern-
ment Accountability Office study found that the
shorter deadlines to enroll workers in the TAA
program, although designed to deliver assistance
quickly to displaced workers, had the effect of
misallocating training resources. Workers did
not always enroll in the most appropriate cours-
es, as the government agencies sought to fulfill
the 40-day processing time limit imposed on
them in the 2002 Trade Act.24 In its most recent
assessment, the federal government rated the
trade adjustment assistance program as “ineffec-
tive” on the grounds that it serves only a subset
of affected workers and outcomes fall short of
performance targets.25
Some advocates of free trade have argued
that, because the visible nature of job losses from
trade might influence political decisions and halt
the pace of freeing trade, these displaced workers
deserve special benefits over and above what is
paid to those who have lost their jobs for other
reasons. While that might be a credible argu-
ment when serious trade liberalization efforts are
in the balance and need a “final push,” that is
presently not the case. In fact, organized labor in
the United States has continued to push for
expanded “trade adjustment assistance” even as
they strongly resist any new trade agreements on
the grounds that the adjustment assistance given
to workers is inadequate and that the country
needs a “moratorium on new trade agreements
until we can rewrite them to protect and advance
workers’ interests.”26 Although the AFL-CIO
has said it will not lobby actively against the
pending preferential trade agreements between
the United States and Peru and Panama, it has
not given its outright support for the pacts and
will oppose the outstanding agreements with
Colombia and South Korea. Another coalition
of unions,Change to Win,has opposed all pend-
ing trade agreements.
With new trade agreements unlikely in the
near term, the “grand bargain” argument for
TAA vanishes. If these programs ever made
political sense—to buy support for trade liber-
alization—they certainly do not when no fur-
ther liberalization is in the offing.
Advocates of TAA say that because free trade
is not the status quo, changes in policy deserve
compensation. In the press release to announce
their new trade adjustment assistance bill (see
next section),Sens.Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and
Max Baucus (D-MT) asserted that “Unlike job
losses due to technological advances or competi-
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tion among similarly regulated companies, which
result from the initiative of private enterprise,
trade liberalization that sacrifices foundational
domestic industries is a policy choice.”27 Jane
McDonald-Pines of the AFL-CIO said in recent
congressional testimony that “all workers who are
forced to sacrifice their livelihoods so that other
Americans may benefit from federal trade policies
should be made whole for their loss.”28
Those statements are based on flawed think-
ing: removing trade barriers is no more a “policy
choice” than allowing domestic competition or
new technology to emerge, both of which can
also cause job losses. In any case, when a policy
choice is made to enact trade restrictions, con-
sumers receive no compensation for their loss.
And what are these “foundational domestic
industries” that trade liberalization supposedly
“sacrifices”? Carpet making? T-shirts? Furniture?
While there may be some justification for pro-
moting the domestic production of truly strate-
gic industries (primarily those relating to nation-
al defense and intelligence) through subsidies,
protecting textiles, clothing, and footwear would
not reasonably be part of such a policy.
Calls for Expanding TAA
One of the key arguments made by propo-
nents of expanding TAA is that the current
emphasis in the regulations on workers who
make manufactured goods unfairly excludes
service workers. In her testimony to a Senate
Finance Committee hearing, Jane McDonald-
Pines of the AFL-CIO charged that the TAA
program was underfunded and badly adminis-
trated. She prefaced her remarks by declaring
that TAA expansion should occur whether or
not trade promotion authority is extended
and/or new trade agreements are approved.
According to McDonald-Pines, “Millions of
workers are suffering from the displacement
effects of our trade policies . . .These workers
are forced to pay the price for federal policy
decisions that benefit other Americans, and
they deserve to be made whole for their loss.”29
She recommended extending the program to
service workers and even public-sector workers
and supports industrywide certification to
make determinations more “equitable.”
The data show that the main beneficiaries
of TAA have indeed been workers previously
employed in manufacturing, especially of
equipment and textiles (see Table 3). Although
services have been flourishing in the United
States, labor-intensive manufactures, not typi-
cally seen as America’s comparative advantage
and therefore more vulnerable to competition
from imports, comprise the majority of certifi-
cations for TAA.
Congress has responded to the call for more
resources. Nine separate proposals have been
submitted by members of Congress, proposing
various expansions and changes to the pro-
gram, ranging from a simple three-month
extension of the current program to significant
changes to the level of benefits and the certifi-
cation process.
In the latter category, Rep. Jim McDermott
(D-WA) introduced a bill—HR 2202, the
Worker Empowerment Act, with a Senate
companion bill introduced by Sen. Charles
Schumer (D-NY)—to establish a national wage
insurance program to supplement the paychecks
of all workers who take lower-paying jobs fol-
lowing displacement through no fault of their
own (i.e., not just as a result of import competi-
tion). The bill allows for half of a worker’s lost
wages to be replaced by a government check for
two years, up to a total of $10,000 per year.
Workers earning less than half of the median
income will have slightly more than half of their
wages replaced, and workers earning above the
Social Security base of $94,200 will face phased-
down wage replacement rates. The wage insur-
ance would be financed by a tax on employers
equal to 0.06 percent of each employee’s wages
until the worker earns the contribution and ben-
efit base (currently $94,200 per year), which
would cost an average $24 per year for each
worker covered, with the federal government
contributing $7.4 billion to the scheme.30
Clearly some workers in certain industries are
more at risk of losing their jobs than others. The
compulsory scheme proposed by McDermott
and Schumer, however, prescribes the same (pro-
portional) premium for all workers, regardless of
8
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the level of unemployment risk. Employees at a
lower risk of job loss are hardly “empowered” by
being forced to subsidize the insurance of those
more at risk of losing their jobs. Even for the
unemployed, the Worker Empowerment Act is
anything but empowering. Workers are not
empowered if their employer is forced to pur-
chase insurance from the government without
any oversight or choice on the part of the work-
er who is paying for the insurance. Worse, the
insurance would act as a tax on employment,
placing a further disincentive on the part of
employers to hire more workers.
Sens. Max Baucus (D-MT) and Olympia
Snowe (R-ME) recently introduced legislation
(S. 1848) that would expand the current trade
adjustment assistance to include more workers
and higher benefits and extend the current pro-
gram to 2012.31 The Trade and Globalization
Adjustment Act of 2007 seeks to amend the
1974 Act to “address the impact of globaliza-
tion, to reauthorize trade adjustment assis-
tance, to extend trade adjustment assistance to
service workers, communities, firms, and farm-
ers, and for other purposes.”32 The main provi-
sions are an expanded eligibility test, so that
service workers and workers whose firms shift
production to countries that do not share a
preferential trade agreement or nonreciprocal
trade preferences with the United States (read:
India and China) can claim benefits. Baucus
and Snowe proposed to extend TAA to service
workers despite the impressive growth in ser-
vice sector employment since 1997, a sector
that now employs 80 percent of the U.S. pop-
ulation. Moreover, many jobs within the ser-
vice sector, such as professional and business
services and education and health services, pay
higher wages than manufacturing jobs.33
Baucus and Snowe would widen the catego-
ry of potential beneficiaries to include “commu-
nities affected by trade” and allow for “strategic
planning grants (with preferences given to rural
communities).”34 Under their bill, a worker can
earn up to $60,000 (instead of the current
$50,000) before becoming ineligible for trade
readjustment allowances or wage insurance, and
the maximum two-year benefit is $12,000, up
from $10,000. The bill also requires a “coordi-
nated Federal response to economic dislocation
in communities negatively impacted by trade.”35
Granted, some costs from import competition
are concentrated geographically. But even if it
were a federal responsibility to direct relief
efforts for communities suffering job losses—
which it is not—it can hardly be said that the
federal government has proven an effective
“coordinated responder” in recent years.
9
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Table 3
TAA Distribution of Certifications by Industry, FY2006
Industry Number of Certifications
Textile mill products 180
Apparel and other products made from fabric 170
Electronic equipment/components, excluding computer equipment 134
Industrial and commercial machinery and other equipment 106
Transport equipment 92
Fabricated metal products 92
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 87
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 75
Primary metal industries 65
Chemicals and allied products 51
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, “Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)
Distribution of Certifications by Industry Fiscal Year 2006,” www.doeta.gov/tradeact/certs_2006.cfm. 
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The Baucus-Snowe bill increases TAA’s
health insurance tax credit from 65 percent to 85
percent of the premium and “improve[s] cover-
age of spouses and dependents.”36 And, as if the
eligibility criteria were not widened enough, the
bill would allow for industrywide certification. In
other words, if the Secretary of Labor certifies
more than three petitions from an industry (e.g.,
three separate factories within the same indus-
try), laid-off workers from that industry could
immediately enroll in the TAA program with-
out their cases being assessed separately. The
Baucus-Snowe bill more than triples the
allowance for trade adjustment assistance to
firms that can prove a decline in their sales of 20
percent over five years. The alternative TAA
program would become available for workers as
young as 40 (the current eligibility age is 50),
with wage replacement of up to $6,000 available
if they are reemployed at a lower wage. It dou-
bles the training funding to $440 million per
year and inserts an automatic funding reautho-
rization, even if the previous year’s authorization
is left partially unspent.
Senator Baucus is also the cosponsor of the
Trade Adjustment Assistance Improvement
Act of 2007, S. 122, which proposes new chan-
nels for initiating a petition for TAA. The bill
also ties the granting of TAA to trade remedies
cases such as antidumping or countervailing
duties and could lead to industrywide certifica-
tion of workers for TAA. It would also estab-
lish yet another administrative office to oversee
TAA.
Some academic economists have also pro-
posed changes to the way trade-displaced work-
ers are treated, ostensibly to stem the tide of pro-
tectionism. Kenneth F. Scheve of Yale University
and Matthew J. Slaughter of Dartmouth have
proposed a substantial redistribution of income
through changes in the tax system.They suggest
eliminating the payroll tax for workers earning
less than the national median income. The
authors calculate that the 67 million workers
earning below the median income would receive
a tax cut of about $3,800 each.37 The shortfall in
taxes (about $256 billion) would be paid for by
raising the payroll tax on workers earning above
median income, increasing the income point
(currently $94,200) at which the Social Security
tax rate goes down, or both.
Soaking the rich is not a new idea. But it is
especially misguided when the solution could
have worse consequences than the initial prob-
lem. While Scheve and Slaughter argue that
“current ignorance about the exact causes of the
skewed income growth is not reason for inac-
tion,” it is precisely the unknown nature of the
rise in inequality—not to mention its disputed
extent—that cautions against harsh fiscal
action.38 Their proposal is not conditioned
upon further trade liberalization, nor is the tax
break given to only those who lose their jobs
because of import competition. The risk is that
the tax changes would be pocketed by orga-
nized labor, yet not placate their demands for a
halt to trade liberalization or further expan-
sions in TAA.
Scheve and Slaughter’s plan is based on the
flawed premise that inequality is inherently
unjust. As long as property is acquired legally
and not through fraud, inequality is not unfair.
Compulsory redistribution of income does not
necessarily create a more just society, and in fact
is an affront to private property rights. The pro-
gressive taxation system already in place in the
United States has not appeared to alleviate con-
cerns about income inequality, whether because
of trade or other causes, and it is not clear that
Scheve and Slaughter’s proposal would create a
groundswell of support for trade liberalization.
Although their individual policy prescrip-
tions vary, all of the above proposals have a few
things in common. First, they advocate an
expansion in the size of federal government
rather than a fresh look at how individuals can
be more free to arrange their own affairs.
Second, they rely on the old thinking that trade
creates victims, and those victims need extra
help (although the potentially very expensive
McDermott/Schumer bill would extend wage
insurance to all workers).
Third, they are all based on a misguided sense
of the proper role of government. Sen. Baucus
best summarized this flawed thinking by quoting
President Kennedy, who said that “there is an
obligation to render assistance to those who suf-
fer as a result of national trade policy.”39 That
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sentiment is based on two fundamental errors.
First, no such obligation exists, at least not in the
U.S. Constitution. Second, even if such an oblig-
ation existed, consumers are surely well overdue
for government assistance in compensation for
the injury that they suffer every day as a result of
national trade policy, through higher prices and
restricted choice.The fact that we take bad trade
policy for granted distorts our perceptions about
who deserves to be compensated.
Adjustment Assistance for 
a Free Society
Some of the proposals discussed above are
preferable to more extreme actions such as
slowing the pace of globalization and with-
drawing from current trade liberalization com-
mitments. But a wider discussion would also
consider the steps that the government (and
others) could take to hold the line against pro-
tectionism while still respecting private proper-
ty and freedom.
Abandoning misguided mercantilist rhetoric
and openly acknowledging the true costs of trade
restrictions would allow a proper examination of
whether TAA is needed at all.Free trade advocates
clearly must improve their efforts to promote the
benefits of trade and the costs of protectionism, as
an antidote to the flawed commentary gaining
ground in the public sphere. We should make
clear that freeing trade is undoing the damage
done by prior policy choices.
Some commentators have attributed Ameri-
cans’ fear of globalization to the importance of
employer-provided health care. A relatively large
proportion of health insurance is linked to
employment in the United States, compared
with many countries in, say, Western Europe
where socialized medicine is more common. A
major change that the government could make
in that regard is to reform the tax code so that
workers are not penalized for purchasing indi-
vidual health insurance rather than purchasing
their insurance through their employer. That
would go a long way toward alleviating the anx-
iety felt by American workers that if they lost
their job, their health insurance would follow.
If workers are able to open portable health
savings accounts (HSAs), for example, they
could build up reserves in their HSA while
they were employed. Those reserves would
provide a financial buffer for the time between
jobs. It is, of course, a good idea to level the
playing field between employer-based and
individually purchased health insurance for its
own sake, not simply because it would also ease
fears about the effects of globalization.40
That U.S. companies have more freedom to
hire and fire surely accounts for a significant part
of the impressive dynamism and flexibility to
respond to change exhibited by the United States
in recent decades. One only has to compare the
U.S. with Germany (unemployment rate in
August 2007—9.0 percent) to see that a relative-
ly unfettered labor market is an asset to the econ-
omy, and attempts to increase government inter-
vention through new payroll taxes would be
counterproductive to efforts to create jobs.
While increased trade necessarily changes
the type of skills demanded by employers, gov-
ernment is by the GAO’s own admission not
the best provider of training or even the most
knowledgeable source of the type of training
that would best suit workers. In any case, work-
er training is not a proper governmental
responsibility. Education and training are bet-
ter suited to the more responsive private sector
and the government would do best to leave
workers free to choose the type of continuing
education and training that suits them best.
Conclusion
Trade has been a net boon for Americans,
even if it no longer makes economic sense to
continue producing certain goods and services
on U.S. soil. Opinion polls cannot be ignored,
however, especially to the extent that they influ-
ence policymakers. Americans’ fear of globaliza-
tion, especially when it threatens jobs, should be
acknowledged and confronted. It should be pos-
sible, however, to promote free trade and open
markets as a matter of principle and without
yielding to demands for more income distribu-
tion based on a misguided sense of entitlement.
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Americans who lose their jobs because of
domestic competition, changing consumer
tastes, or technological advances are no more or
less worthy of government support than those
whose jobs are displaced because of rising
imports. The changes recommended above
should be extended to all workers rather than a
selected subset, to reflect the fact that trade
accounts for a relatively minor source of unem-
ployment. The government should allow peo-
ple to adjust to new opportunities, rather than
attempting in vain to preserve the status quo.
Certainly it is preferable to harness and redis-
tribute the dynamic, ongoing gains from freeing
trade rather than to deny them altogether by pro-
tecting chosen domestic industries, especially
because the costs associated with adjusting to
trade are one-time charges. But a third option
exists that would promote freer trade and open
markets while limiting the role of government:
By making systemic changes—leveling the play-
ing field for individually funded health insurance
and increasing labor market flexibility to aid the
creation of new jobs—policymakers can enable a
more prosperous and free society to emerge.
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